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One of the most pressing international environmental issues today is
how to allocate the burden of achieving carbon reductions among nations.
One superficially appealing approach—adopted in part by the Kyoto Protocol
and the EU’s European Trading System—is to require that each nation reduce
its aggregate annual emissions by an equal percentage. Other approaches,
including the one adopted in later phases of the European Trading System,
require reductions in emissions according to the relative wealth of each
nation. Still other approaches that have been discussed include requiring each
nation to reduce per capita (as opposed to aggregate) emissions by an equal
percentage.
None of these approaches, however, has provided a workable system of
emissions reductions that appears capable of garnering worldwide acceptance.
In this Article we explore another option, one roughly modeled on the
United States Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Rule. In
the proposed Clean Power Rule, EPA was required to allocate the burden
of reducing carbon emissions from electricity production among the States.
EPA chose a novel approach that is quite different from that adopted
in Kyoto or the EU—what we call a “Switching Costs” approach. Under this
approach, each State is allocated reduction percentages in emissions rates
or mass emissions that depend heavily on the State’s switching opportunities—
its opportunities to switch from coal to natural gas and from fossil-fuel
energy sources to renewable energy. In states in which switching opportunities
are relatively abundant, and hence transition costs relatively low, higher
percentage reductions in emission rates per megawatt or mass emissions
are required. One result is that increases in electricity rates in the State
should be more similar, closer to equal, than they would be under an approach
that required emissions reductions without regard to variations in the switching
opportunities available to each State. Thus, as Bob Sussman reported,
EPA’s analysis of its proposed Rule’s effects on rates in twenty different
regions within the United States suggested that rates will “vary somewhat”
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but “these variations are fairly small, generally within 2 percent below
or above the national average in 2030 1
The final EPA rule seems to limit the range in state targets and perhaps
reduce the extent of variation in state targets based on the differences
in switching opportunities available to each state. For example, Arizona, which
has readily available solar alternatives, faced a much higher target under the
proposed plan than the final rule. On the other hand, Kentucky, which is
coal-dependent and has little in the way of an infrastructure to allow a ready
shift to natural gas or renewables, faced a much lower target under the
proposed plan than under the final rule. Moreover, EPA does not appear
to have released an analysis of how much the final rule, as opposed to the
proposed one, will affect electricity rates in different regions of the United
States; EPA seems to suggest that the final rule has so much flexibility
built into it that costs cannot be predicted on a state-by-state basis. It is
possible that there will be more substantial variation in ratepayer costs across
the country as a result of the EPA final rule than under the proposed rule.
Nonetheless, we can use the EPA Rule as an approach to allocation of
carbon reductions among the member states or nations to a multilateral
agreement that is based on the relative availability and hence relative costs
to each participant of switching from a high-emission fossil fuel to a
lower-emission one and/or switching power production to renewable
sources. Nations for whom switching would be relatively less expensive
would be required to reduce emissions more (either in terms of the emissions
rate per megawatt or in terms of mass emissions) than nations for whom
switching would be relatively more expensive. Focusing on the availability
of switching opportunities and hence the costs of emission reductions to
ratepayers as the measure for what constitutes an “equal” or “fair” burden
among states or nations has several normative and political feasibility
advantages over other approaches. Just as when a group of diners agree to
split a bill for a large dinner in which each diner ordered different items
with somewhat different prices and each diner has a different economic
situation, allocation emissions reductions based on an equal ratepayer costs
or something close to it avoids normatively intractable arguments about
how much each state or nations’ population is ethically responsible for

1. Bob Sussman, Debating the EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposal—EPA’s State
Goals for Reducing Carbon Pollution from Power Plants: A Thoughtful and Fair Solution,
BROOKINGS: THE P LANET P OLICY (Aug. 18, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/08/18-debating-epa-clean-power-proposal.
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its historic emissions (as opposed to current ones) and how much differences
in wealth should translate into differences in ethical obligations with regard
to efforts to address common problem. Everyone puts in roughly the same
amount to the pot. And because as a political reality those states or nations
that have relatively few switching opportunities and hence relatively high
switching costs are likely to be much more politically resistant to ambitious
emissions targets than those that have ample switching opportunities and
relatively low switching costs, this approach may be more politically
acceptable than those that have been tried to date.
However, one potential downside is that the switching opportunities
approach may create a disincentive for a state (or nation) to create more
opportunities for transitioning to low- or zero-emission power sources,
because such efforts could result in the state (or nation) being allocated a
higher emission reductions target in the next round of targets, which, if
nothing else, reduces its flexibility as to future energy-related and economic
decisions. Switching costs are in part the product of factors outside of direct
political control—how much sun or wind that is available to a given jurisdiction
is in part a product of geography—but they are also a product of political
decisions regarding public investments and incentives for private investments
in energy production infrastructure. There are, however, ways to deal with
such disincentives that make the switching opportunities approach a promising
model for international accords. Indeed, EPA took a step in this direction
in the Final Rule by offering credit awards to states that quickly create
renewable generation capacity.
Allocations of emissions reductions (either in terms of rate per megawatt
or by mass) in terms of switching opportunities and switching costs might be
a less appealing and less compelling idea in a regime in which there is
highly effective tradable-permit or carbon tax regime. In an ideal tradable
permit regime and an ideal carbon tax regime, we would expect to see
the largest reductions in emissions in places in which the costs of reducing
carbon emissions by whatever means are available are lowest, and that
would imply that, at least among otherwise similar jurisdictions (notably,
jurisdictions with comparable efficiency levels at emitting facilities and
comparable demand-side conservation or efficiency), we would expect
to see greater reductions in those where switching costs were relatively low.
However, the transaction costs and political economy problems surrounding
CO 2 cap-and-trade regimes have been much discussed, as have the institutional
design and political feasibility problems of carbon taxes. In the United
States, for example, any hint of an explicit carbon tax has been disavowed
by political leaders, and Australia recently repealed its carbon tax. It
may well be that an agreement based on a switching-costs-sensitive initial
allocation of emissions reduction obligations could have the political traction
to actually be adopted, and, once adopted, trading and taxing carbon could
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be added as an overlay to further reduce costs of emissions reductions.
But even so, beginning with a switching-cost-sensitive allocation may
be necessary to move to a workable trading or tax regime. In this account,
a switching-costs-sensitive-allocation is the second-best regime that may
allow for the realization of the first-best regime.
In Part I, this paper reviews the allocation plans that have been tried
so far on an international scale and why they have not succeeded. In Part
II, the paper explains EPA’s Clean Power Rule and what we are calling the
switching opportunities approach that is at least roughly suggested by
the Rule. In Part III, the paper discusses the two different “cost-sensitive”
approaches adopted by the EPA under the Clean Air Act so far, and in
Part IV, the paper discusses the basis for using the Clean Power Plan as a
model and the advantages and disadvantages of “scaling up” the switching
opportunities approach to the international arena.
I. PAST AND CURRENT ALLOCATION REGIMES
A. Kyoto Annex I
In 1982, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC) first established an international system for addressing climate
change by nation-states and also established the principle that nations
ought to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) “at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” 2
However, there were no binding emissions reductions commitments in the
UNFCC itself. It wasn’t until 1997 that the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC
sets binding emissions reductions commitments for developed countries (listed
in Annex 1 to the UNFCC) to be met during the period of 2008 to 2012. 3
These reductions were spelled-out for each Annex 1 country in Annexes A
and B of the Kyoto Protocol, and together were designed “to reduc[e] their
overall emissions of [greenhouse] gases by at least 5 percent below 1990
levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.” 4 For most developed
countries, this required the same emissions reduction, namely to 92% of
2. See U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2, June 3, 1992, Treaty
Doc. No. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. DOCS. (1992), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/conveng.pdf.
3. See KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, art. 3, Dec. 10 1997, U.N. Docs FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add.1 (1998),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
4. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 3.1.
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1990 levels by the end of the commitment period (or a roughly 8% reduction
in GHG emissions), while some of the less developed or newly independent
former Soviet states were given higher targets. 5 Developing countries, most
notably China, were not on the list of nations required to reduce emissions. 6
On its face, then, this first approach requires roughly equal emissions
reductions by the most developed countries. However, the Kyoto Protocol
also provides for so-called flexibility mechanisms that might lead to
fewer (or more) emissions reductions in each nation itself. For example,
Article 6 of the Protocol provides for “joint implementation,” which “allows
a country with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the
Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs)
from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B
Party, each equivalent to one tone of CO2, which can be counted towards
meeting its Kyoto target.” 7 Similarly, Article 17 of the Protocol allows for
Emissions Trading, which “allows countries that have emission units to spare
—emissions permitted them but not “used”—to sell this excess capacity
to countries that are over their targets.” 8 And Article 12 establishes the
so-called Clean Development Mechanism, which “allows a country with
an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto
Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in
developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission
reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can
be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.” 9
Nonetheless, despite these flexibility mechanisms, the basic principle
under the Kyoto Protocol remains the same. The most developed countries
must reduce emissions by roughly equal amounts. The only flexibility is
in whether those emissions reductions take place within the country or
outside it.
B. The European Union’s ETS
Following the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union (EU) instituted an
emissions trading system (ETS) in order to fulfill its member states’
5.
6.
7.

Id. at Annex B.
Id.
See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, KYOTO P ROTOCOL:
MECHANISM: JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint
_implementation/ items/1674.php; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note at 3, art. 6.
8. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, KYOTO PROTOCOL:
MECHANISM: INTERNATIONAL EMISSION TRAINING, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mec
hanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php.
9. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, KYOTO P ROTOCOL:
M ECHANISM : C LEAN D EVELOPMENT M ECHANISM , http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php.
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obligations under the treaty. Under the ETS, the EU employed two different
methods of allocating responsibility for controlling GHGs. First, the EU
adopted a system that allocated responsibility according to the individual
country’s wealth. Then, as the Kyoto commitment period ended, the EU
adopted a system that allocated responsibility collectively. Finally, the EU
also adopted mandatory annual emissions targets for sectors not covered
by ETS.
1. ETS Phases I and II—Individual Wealth Allocation
As an Annex I party to the Kyoto Protocol, the European Community and
its 15 Member States at the time of ratifying the Protocol agreed to reduce
GHG emissions by at least 8% below 1990 levels during the “commitment
period” of 2008 to 2012. 10 By signing on as a collective entity, the EU
took the first step in setting up a “cap and trade” system among its Member
States. The basic structure of such a system entails establishing an overall
limit, or cap, on GHG emissions, granting facilities that emit GHGs allowances
for each ton of carbon dioxide (or equivalent) that they emit, and giving
the business that control these facilities one of three main options. They
can emit as much carbon dioxide as they have allowances, emit less and
trade their excess allowances, or emit more and purchase excess allowances.
By reducing the number of total allowances each year and penalizing
businesses for non-compliance, total emissions decline, while businesses
are incentivized to invest in emission-reducing capital projects. 11
The EU administered this program through its ETS. In preparation for
the Kyoto commitment period, the EU created a preliminary first phase
which functioned as a pilot program for testing out this new cap and trade
system, while the second phase coincided with the commitment period
from 2008 to 2012. 12 The EU further allocated responsibility for the 8%
reduction among its Member States based on relative wealth.13 For example,

10. UNITED NATIONS F RAMEWORK CONVENTION ON C LIMATE CHANGE, KYOTO
PROTOCOL REFERENCE MANUAL ON ACCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED AMOUNT 13
(2008), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.pdf.
11. Allowances and Caps, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/cap/index_en.htm (last updated Apr. 21, 2016).
12. EU ETS 2005-2012, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/polici
es/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2016).
13. Kyoto emissions targets: Joint fulfillment, ‘burden sharing’ and base years,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20150703071343/http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/g-gas/kyoto/index_en.htm (last updated May. 8, 2015).
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the nation with the highest GDP per capita, Luxembourg, had to reduce its
emissions by 28% vs. 1990 levels, whereas Portugal as the poorest of the 15
was allowed to increase its emissions by 27%. 14 With caps in place for each
individual country, each Member State submitted National Allocation Plans
(NAPs) that provided detailed emissions information for each GHG-emitting
facility, or “installation” covered by the Kyoto Protocol—mainly power
generators and energy-intensive industrial sectors—within its borders. 15
The EU subsequently reviewed the NAPs and granted the appropriate
number of allowances to individual installations so that Member States met
their individual reduction targets.16 Thus, by signing onto Kyoto as a collective
entity, the EU created a system that redistributed individual nations’
responsibilities for climate change based on wealth relative to fellow
Member States.
2. ETS Phase III—Collective Allocation
As the Kyoto commitment period ended and follow-on international
climate change negotiations stalled, the EU continued the ETS program,
with some modifications to increase its effectiveness.17 Phase III, which
started in 2013, maintained the basic structure of the system, but eliminated
caps for individual countries. 18 Instead, the EU established a single cap
to cover the entire Union, which decreases over the course of Phase III, such
that 2020 emissions will be 21% lower than 2005 levels. 19 The responsibility
to reduce emissions then falls directly upon individual GHG-emitting
installations to reduce emissions each year, or purchase a sufficient number
of allowances via the cap-and-trade system to cover actual emissions.20
Thus, Member States are effectively bypassed in allocating responsibility, as
an installation that emits 1,000 tons of carbon dioxide in Luxembourg will
be treated exactly the same as an installation that emits 1,000 tons of

14. Id.
15. National allocation plans, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/pre2013/nap/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2016).
16. Id.
17. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status
of the Doha Amendment, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php
(last updated May 28, 2015).
18. Allowances and Caps, EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 11.
19. The cap set in 2013 was 2,084,301,856 allowances, decreasing by 1.74% linearly
each year through 2020. Id. The EU changed the reference year for climate change
objectives from 1990 to 2005 because the wealth of data collected in 2005 provides the
most transparent method to measure progress. Questions and Answers on the Effort
Sharing Decision (October 2013), EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/
faq_en.htm (last updated Apr. 15, 2016).
20. Allowances and Caps, EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 11.
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carbon dioxide in Portugal. This system therefore treats Member States
as equals, restricting emissions activity only to the extent that a Member
State has GHG-emitting facilities within its borders.
As an alternative view, this approach also allocates responsibility among
Member States based on their relative income levels. Assuming richer
states to have more GHG-emitting facilities within its borders as a reflection
of more extensive industrialization, while poorer, less industrialized nations
will have fewer GHG-emitting facilities, Phase III effectively requires
richer states to bear more of the burden of reducing emissions than poorer
states. While this approach is quite different from that of Phases I and
II—namely because individual facilities are treated exactly the same in
Phase III regardless of location within the EU—it still promulgates sharing
responsibility based on some variation of relative income levels.
3. Non-ETS/ Effort Sharing Decision
Since that ETS only covers approximately half of all GHG emissions,
EU Member States adopted mandatory annual emissions targets for sectors
not covered by ETS under the Effort Sharing Decision. 21 Similar to the
approach in ETS Phases I and II, the Effort Sharing Decision establishes
caps for each Member State based on their relative GDP, with rich countries
required to decrease emissions while granting poorer countries the flexibility
to increase emissions. 22 In particular, the Decision establishes limits for
annual GHG emissions in 2020 compared to 2005 levels based on a Member
State’s GDP per capita relative to the EU average. 23 Countries with GDP
per capita higher than the average must reduce their emissions by up to
20%, while nations lower than the average may increase their emissions
up to 20%. 24 In the aggregate, these restrictions should reduce EU-wide
21. ETS Phase III covered less than half of all emissions, including carbon dioxide
from power and heat generation, energy-intensive sectors, and commercial aviation; nitrous
oxide from production of nitric, adipic, glyoxal and glyoxlic acids; and perfluorocarbons
from aluminum production. Sectors not covered by ETS include transport (excluding
aviation), buildings, agriculture, and waste sectors, which collectively account for 55% to
60% of all EU emissions. Effort Sharing Decision, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/effort/index_en.htm (last updated Apr. 15, 2016).
22. Id.
23. Decision No. 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to
meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, 2009
O.J. (L 140/136).
24. Id.
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emissions in non-ETS sectors by 10% compared to 2005 levels. 25 Combining
that with the 21% reduction in ETS sectors is expected to accomplish the
overall emissions reduction goal of 20% in 2020 vs. 1990 levels. 26
Therefore, as with ETS Phases I and II, emission reduction efforts for
non-ETS sectors allocate responsibility based on each Member States’
relative income. Wealthy countries must cut emissions, while poorer countries
may increase emissions. However, this approach is built upon the assumption
that less wealthy countries will experience a higher rate of economic growth,
leading to higher emissions, so such countries will still effectively need to
reduce their emissions over the period. 27 Nevertheless, in striking the Effort
Sharing Decision, Member States divided up emission reductions based
on relative wealth.
C. Current Schemes Unsuccessful
While the current allocation schemes described supra have certainly
done something to reduce GHG emissions, they have been demonstrably
inadequate. By almost every account, the Kyoto Protocol has not resulted
in substantial emissions reductions. It has not obtained the formal
agreement of the United States, and formal signatories appear to be largely
unmoved by it with respect to actual energy policy decisions. Emissions
continue to rise, and when and where they stall, economic slowdowns
appear to account for that phenomenon as much or more than Kyoto-inspired
policy. By all accounts, the first phase of the EU ETS did not produce
emissions reductions that otherwise would not have occurred. It is possible
that the current phase will fare much better. But the current phase requires
centralized planning and regulation in the form of per-facility targets that
is hard to imagine outside of federal or quasi-federal union, and thus is
hard to imagine working as part of an international agreement on the scale
of Kyoto or even a multilateral agreement among non-common-union nation
states.
The Kyoto and to a large Extent EU approach to allocation is costinsensitive. Emission reductions targets are allocated without regard to the
question of how much it would cost to have each target achieved. Thus,
on its face, putting aside the possibility that trading or other mechanisms
will help equalize costs to a degree, this approach calls on some actors to
take on targets that entail very high compliance costs relative top others.

25. Questions and Answers on the Effort Sharing Decision (October 2013), supra
note 19.
26. Effort Sharing Decision, EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 21.
27. Id.
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From both an efficiency and equity perspective, this is problematic, as
commentators have explained. 28
The post-Kyoto round of talks have focused on inclusion of a larger
number of nations, including poorer or less industrialized nations, and have
involved extensive discussions of differentiated responsibilities based on
a range of factors—wealth or GDP of the nation, economic dependence on
fossil fuel production, threat from climate change and need to adapt, as,
for example, in the case of low-lying countries. But the compliance costs
for each nation of emission reductions—and in particular costs of switching
from coal to oil to natural gas and from fossil fuels to renewables—has not
been an explicit focus of the largely unfocused discussions of differentiated
responsibilities.
II. PROPOSED AND POSSIBLE FUTURE ALLOCATION REGIMES
A. Equal Emissions Per Capita, Emissions Based on Historical
Contribution to Climate Change, and Emissions Based
on GNP or GNP Per Capita
Given the failure of the current regime, it is natural to ask whether a
different emissions reduction scheme would do better. There has been no
shortage of other schemes proposed. For example, some developing
nations such as China have proposed allocating emissions reductions per
capita. 29 The aim of such a scheme would be to allow roughly equal
emissions for each person in the world, regardless of where they lived.
“The intuition here is that every person on the planet should begin with
the same emissions right; it should not matter whether people find
themselves in a nation whose existing emissions rates are low or high.” 30
While such a scheme certainly has intuitive appeal, there are several reasons
why it will likely never become the basis for a new agreement. First, for
28. Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change,
32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 294 (2008) (“Many analysts—particularly economists—have
been highly critical of the Kyoto Protocol, noting that, because of specific deficiencies, it
will be ineffective and relatively costly for the little it accomplishes.”) (citing Joseph E.
Aldy, Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global
Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373 (2003)).
29. See, e.g., China’s National Climate Change Programme (promulgated by the
Nat’l Development and Reform Commission, June 2007), at 58 (China), www.ccchina.gov.cn/
website/ccchina/upfile/file188.pdf.
30. Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on
a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 53 (2009).
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pragmatic reasons, developed countries like the United States will likely
never agree to it. “Nations are unlikely to sign an international agreement
if they will be significant net losers, and wealthy nations might lose a great
deal from any approach that does not use existing emissions as the baseline
for reductions.” 31 Second, it is not even clear that the per capita approach
would benefit most developing nations. As Posner and Sunstein demonstrate,
“there are rich small states [], and poor big states [], and everything in between.
[T]here is no statistically significant correlation between population and per
capita GDP.” 32 While China and India would certainly benefit from such
a scheme, many other developing nations would not.
In sum, it is highly unlikely that a per capita emissions scheme will form
the basis of a new agreement going forward, and it is equally unlikely that
such a scheme would fulfill the distributive justice rationales that underpin
it in any event.
Similar objections surround proposals to gear emissions reductions to
nation’s historical contributions to net carbon emissions. In this polluterpay approach, nations that have long been industrialized would pay much
more than newly or non-industrialized nations. But, normatively, holding
current populations of industrialized countries responsible for past emissions
by past generations is problematic, at least from some philosophical
perspectives as Posner and Sunstein also argue. Moreover, politically, the
idea that past polluting nations owe much more in terms of emissions
reduction efforts because of their past “wrongs” would seem to be a political
non-starter that would run counter to the “we are all in this together” spirit of
collective action against climate change, which may be necessary to achieve
success.
Allocations tied to a nation’s GDP are also normatively problematic,
because there is no widespread acceptance by as to what constitutes a
“rich” country as opposed to a “middle class” or poor one and, even more
so, there is no widespread agreement as to how much of a social obligation
or an obligation of helping rich nations owe or should be deemed to owe
poor ones. Indeed, it is not obvious that there is a general buy-in to the
idea that rich countries should substantially aid poor ones: much foreign
aid by wealthy countries, and by the U.S. in particular, appears driven by
military and geopolitical considerations more than a normative commitment
to help nations in need.

31. Id. at 55.
32. Id. at 74. They also note that because permits are allocated to governments, not
citizens, wealthy elites in developing nations would likely still hold the dominant number
of permits. Id. at 75.
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B. Allocation Based on Net Welfare Benefits of Emissions
Reductions and Climate Change Mitigation
As economists have pointed out, the equal-percentage-reduction approach
of Kyoto and (to a lesser degree) the EU has no rationale in welfare
economics, which would endeavor to factor in costs and benefits to each
nation of reducing emissions. But an allocation regime based on equalwelfare-effects would be far too complex and contestable to be workable.
How much each nation benefits from reducing carbon in the atmosphere
is not an easy question: some nations are more vulnerable to climate
change but there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding vulnerabilities in
the event of different climate change scenarios, as well as the basic
uncertainty as to what effect any climate change mitigation effort will have
on climate change. Reducing emissions may have substantial non-climate
health benefits, such as less asthma or other lung diseases, but these too
may be contestable and it is not obvious that a nation that has not been
motivated to achieve these health benefits for their own sake would accept
their being used as a rationale for being subject to a higher emissions
reductions target than they would have received without consideration of
those benefits.
In welfare economics, benefits are only half the picture; costs are the other
half. To assess the full economic costs to each nation of emissions reductions,
an assessment, not just of the direct cost of compliance with possible
emissions reduction targets, but also with the overall economic effects of
the compliance efforts, including downstream effects on investment, savings,
and employment would be required. As suggested by the debates in the
United States over whether any given environmental regulation will ruin an
industry or actually help it long-term, or whether an environmental regulation
is an economic drag or a long-term win-win, it is highly contestable what the
overall economic costs of a nation shifting to a low-carbon or no-carbon
future will be. For that reason presumably, and defensibly, the EPA in the
Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Air Act refuses to attempt to quantify
social costs of its rule and uses compliance costs as the sole costs to be
considered as part of a cost benefit analysis. As discussed below, however,
the direct, upfront, compliance costs—the costs of switching from coal to
natural gas and/or coal and gas and oil to renewables—may be more subject
to reliable, commonly-accepted estimates.
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C. Other Possible Schemes
There are many other possible bases for allocating emissions. 33 Yet so
far, none of them has gained any traction in the international talks designed
to lead to a new agreement. Instead, the latest U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) has
relied on Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), a process
whereby nations determine their own contributions to GHG emissions
reductions. The hope is that such an approach “can create a constructive
feedback loop between national and international decision-making on
climate change.” 34 However, such INDCs have also been criticized as
lacking transparency. 35 In addition, while almost 87% of global emissions
are covered by countries that have submitted INDCs, 36 there are serious
concerns that these pledges, even if adhered to, will not meet the goal of
keeping average global temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius.37
Thus, a reasonable question is: are there better ways to allocate responsibility
for carbon emissions (and net reduction thereof) among nations? Is there
an allocative approach that has not yet been tried, but that may work better
in terms of getting nations to agree and keeping average global temperatures
below 2 degrees Celsius?
III. A COST-SENSITIVE APPROACH
Nearly every criticism of emissions reduction measures includes a
concern over costs. Nations are concerned that the overall costs of GHG
reductions will be too high, and/or that such costs will not be shared equitably
among nations. One response to such criticism, then, would be to make
costs an explicit part of any emissions reduction scheme.

33. See DANIEL BODANSKI ET AL., P EW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 1 (2004).
34. See What is an INDC?, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (2015), http://www.wri.org/
indc-definition.
35. See Thomas Damassa et al., Interpreting INDCs: Assessing Transparency of
Pos-2020 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets For 8 Top-Emitting Economies, WORLD
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, at 7 (Dec. 2015), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/wri_wp_
interpretingINDCs.pdf.
36. See U.N. Secretariat, Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions, at 4, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2015/7 (Oct. 30 2015),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf.
37. See Int’l Energy Agency, Energy and Climate Change, at 12 (2015), http://
www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2015SpecialReportonEnergy
andClimateChange.pdf; but see David Victor & Charles Kennel, Climate Policy: Ditch the
2 Degree C Warming Goal, NATURE PUBLISHING GROUP (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.
nature.com/news/climate-policy-ditch-the-2-c-warming-goal-1.16018, for a criticism of
the 2 degree target.
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In this section, we examine two different models for a cost-sensitive
emissions reduction approach. Both models derive from prior EPA
rulemakings under the Clean Air Act. The first and more traditional model
seeks to equalize costs among states with respect to each ton of emissions
reduction. In other words, under this model, states subject to the rule must
each reduce emissions in the amount that can be achieved at a certain
price-per-ton of abatement. This was the EPA’s approach under its various
ozone abatement rules, most recently the Cross State Air Pollution Rule, or
CSAPR, as discussed more fully below.
The second cost-sensitive approach is the one the EPA employed in its
Clean Power Plan. Under this approach, the EPA did not explicitly seek
to equalize the cost-per-ton of emissions abatement. Instead, the EPA
seems to have made certain assumptions about how much it would cost
states to switch to clean power sources, based on factors such as the state’s
natural endowments (sunshine, wind, etc.), the amount of clean power capacity
already built or planned, a state’s political capacity to make further emissions
reductions, and grid accessibility for that state. These various “cost” measures
then became factors in the amount of GHG reductions each state would
be required to bear. The costs were not equalized on a “per ton” measure,
but rather in a more amorphous, overall way.
A. The Traditional Cost-Conscious Model
The EPA initially designed an emissions reduction system that tries to
roughly equalize costs among polluters when it promulgated rules regarding
ozone precursors. In the EPA’s 1998 nitrogen oxide (NOx) SIP call, the
EPA decided that the 23 “significant contributor” upwind states “need only
reduce their ozone by the amount achievable with ‘highly cost-effective
controls,’” which the EPA defined to be “ones that could be achieved (in the
EPA’s estimate) for less than $2000 a ton.” 38 The result of this costbased cutback meant, of course, that emissions reductions “would vary
from state to state depending on variations in cutback costs.” 39 However,
the costs per ton of abatement would remain roughly the same. In other
words, each state would be required to reduce NOx emissions by the
amount that could be achieved at a uniform cost, but because the costsper-ton of reduction for some states would be higher (generally those were

38.
39.

See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 6675 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id.
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the states that had already taken the easy measures to reduce emissions)
and costs-per-ton of reduction for some states would be lower (generally
those were the states that hadn’t done much yet, and thus had several easy
measures still available to them), the end result was that states faced
different percentages of required reduction depending on where they were
along the marginal abatement cost curve.
A similar design was carried forward into EPA’s Cross State Air
Pollution Rule, or CSAPR. Here, EPA designed a system with respect to
the ozone precursors nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ). If
an “upwind” state emits these chemicals in threshold amounts detected at
“downwind” states, then the CSAPR mandates that the upwind states reduce
emissions by reference to certain cost thresholds, which would be uniformly
applied within groups of upwind states. These uniform or equal cost thresholds
are then applied to create different emissions “budgets” in each upwind
state. As the Supreme Court described it: “EPA translated the cost thresholds
it had selected into amounts of emissions upwind States would be required
to eliminate. For each regulated upwind State, EPA created an annual
emissions ‘budget.’ These budgets represented the quantity of pollution
an upwind State would produce in a given year if its in-state sources
implemented all pollution controls available at the chosen cost thresholds.” 40
As with the NOx SIP call, each upwind state under the CSAPR is
subject to a uniform cost threshold, 41 but these uniform costs translate into
different emissions “budgets” for each upwind state. 42 EPA calculated how
much pollution each upwind State could eliminate “if all of its sources
applied pollution control technologies available at particular cost thresholds,”43
and then required the states to reduce pollution by that amount. Again,
this approach attempts to roughly equalize the costs per ton of reduction
that the upwind states will face. Indeed, EPA explicitly rejected a uniform
percentage-of-emissions reduction rule (akin to the Kyoto rule discussed

40. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1621–22 (2014).
41. Technically, the cost thresholds were uniform within different groups of upwind
states. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“In the end, EPA adopted four cost thresholds for the 27 upwind States subject to the
Transport Rule. For all States subject to the Rule for annual NOx, EPA set a $500/ton cost
threshold. See Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,250. For States subject to the Rule for
ozone-season NOx, EPA also set a $500/ton cost threshold. See id. For States subject to
the Rule for SO2, EPA divided the States into two groups. For Group 1 States, EPA set a
$2,300/ton cost threshold. See id. at 48,259. For Group 2 States, EPA set a $500/ton cost
threshold. See id.”).
42. See, e.g., Final June Revisions Rule State Budgets and New Unit Set-Asides
TSD, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION (JUNE 2012), http://www3.epa.
gov/crossstaterule/pdfs/FinalJuneRevisionsRuleStateBudgetsandNewUnitSetAsidesTSD.
pdf (widely varying state budgets).
43. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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supra) because such a rule would have had perverse effects. As the EPA
noted in one of its Technical Support Documents for the Transport Rule:
“since all contributing states would be required to do the same percent
reduction of existing emissions, states that had previously implemented
stringent control programs might not be able to achieve the required
reductions using existing control technologies, while others that had
previously done little (and presumably have larger absolute contributions)
would achieve their required reductions using significantly less than optimal
control technologies.” 44
Of course, some of EPA’s hesitation to use equal percentage reduction
of emission measures in the CSAPR (and in its NOx SIP call) was driven
by the complexity of NOX and SO2 interactions, and the impossibility of
tying individual upwind states’ contributions to particular downwind states’
receptors. 45 Nonetheless, the equal costs idea played a prominent role in
the design of the CSAPR.
This roughly equal costs measure then resulted in varying emissions
budgets for each state. EPA assumed a traditional increasing marginal cost
curve. As it stated in one of its technical documents to the Transport Rule
(the precursor to the CSAPR), “EPA designed a series of IPM [Integrated
Planning Model] runs that imposed increasing marginal costs for reduction
of SO2, annual NOx, or ozone season NOx emissions and tabulated those
projected emissions at each cost level.” 46 In other words, EPA assumed
the marginal cost of emissions abatement would increase as that abatement
increased. With that assumption in mind, EPA then selected various points
along this increasing marginal abatement cost curve and projected emissions
at those levels. It used air quality measures to determine where the marginal
benefits of increased abatement would decrease. Based on these data, EPA
decided what each upwind state’s emissions budget would be.

44. Alternative Significant Contribution Approaches Evaluated, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION (JULY 2000), http://perma.cc/4LJC-SY9N.
45. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1604–05 (2014).
Note that these concerns should not play as large a role with respect to GHG emissions,
because those emissions do not depend on interactions with other GHG emissions for their
potency, nor do they cause local effects that depend on exactly where the wind blows them.
46. See Analysis to Quantify Significant Contribution, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION (JULY 2000), at 6, http://www3.epa.gov/crossstaterule/pdfs/TSD_
analysis_to_quantify_significant_contribution_7-8-10.pdf.

17

BARSA-DANA (DO NOT DELETE)

8/8/2016 3:09 PM

B. EPA’s Clean Power Plan Considers Costs Differently
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan, on the other hand, is sensitive to costs in
a much different way, perhaps because it addresses power plants’ carbon
dioxide emissions, 47 and is aimed, in addition to enhancing efficiency, at
switching power generation away from carbon emitting sources altogether. 48
Under the Clean Power Plan, the EPA assigned emission reduction targets
to each state. 49 These targets vary in terms of the requisite emission
reductions, and are not equal in terms of either a required percentage reduction
in net emissions or emissions per capita, or emissions per household. 50
More precisely, under the EPA’s plan, each state must meet a target of
emission reduction, called the Best System of Emission Reduction, or BSER.
This derives from Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act’s requirement that
EPA prescribe regulations that require each state to submit a plan that
“establishes standards of performance” for existing sources of air pollution.
A “standard of performance” is in turn a term of art, defined under Clean
Air Act Section 111(a)(1) to mean “a standard for emissions of air pollutants
which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health
and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated.”
Based on its evaluation of various GHG abatement measures, “EPA
identified four categories of demonstrated measures, or ‘building blocks,’
that are technically viable and broadly applicable, and can provide costeffective reductions in CO 2 emissions from individual existing EGUs.” 51
These building blocks include the three that were reflected in the final
rule: (1) Increasing the operational efficiency of existing coal-fired power
plants; (2) Shifting electricity generation from higher emitting fossil fuelfired steam power plants (generally coal-fired) to lower emitting natural

47. See FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-overview (last updated
Apr. 11, 2016).
48. See FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Benefits of a Cleaner, More Efficient
Power Sector, U.S. ENVTL. P ROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/factsheet-clean-power-plan-benefits-cleaner-more-efficient-power-sector (last updated Aug. 13,
2015).
49. See FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Framework, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-framework (last updated
May 11, 2013).
50. See id.
51. U.S. E NVTL. P ROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & R ADIATION , GHG ABATEMENT
MEASURES 1-1 (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201406/documents/2014
0602tsd-ghg-abatement-measures.pdf.
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gas-fired power plants; and (3) Increasing electricity generation from
renewable sources of energy like wind and solar. 52
The EPA applies these “building blocks” in order to calculate the BSER
for each state. 53 EPA’s exact formula is complex, and involves a consideration
of a number of judgment calls. In its Goal Computation Technical Support
Document, EPA used historical 2012 emissions data for each state as the
basis for each state’s emission rate goal under the Proposed Rule.54 EPA
then applied the BSER “building blocks” to compute interim and final
goals in various ways. In doing so, certain cost-based factors became clear.
For Building Block 1, for example—the operational efficiency of coal
plants—EPA assumed that, to a certain extent, heat rate improvements at
coal plants (i.e., improvements in the amount of energy required to produce
each kWh of energy) would be highly economically beneficial, perhaps
even paying for themselves.55 EPA looked at factors such as the best historical
heat rate performance for each EGU and calculated the overall potential
for heat rate improvements within each of 3 regional grid interconnections. 56
These factors are consistent with a traditional model where we assume
steadily rising marginal costs of abatement. Indeed, EPA studied various
low-cost measures such as equipment upgrades and contrasted them with
higher-cost “best practices” and noted that some EGUs could achieve almost
all of their emission reductions using equipment upgrades alone. 57
When it comes to energy efficiency in consumption or demand-side
efficiency, which EPA left out of the final “building blocks” (though it
still gives states the opportunity to get credits toward its emission targets
for certain types of energy efficiency projects), EPA also assumed a
52. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN POWER P LAN-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
STATES 1, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/technical-summary-for-states.pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
53. Id. at 1–2.
54. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, GOAL COMPUTATION
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT 4, 8 (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201406/documents/20140602t sd-goal-computation.pdf.
55. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, GREENHOUSE GAS
M ITIGATION M EASURES 2–65 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201511/ documents/tsd-cpp-ghg-mitigation-measures.pdf.
56. Id. at 2–22. See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION,
CO2 EMISSION P ERFORMANCE RATE AND GOAL C OMPUTATION TECHNICAL S UPPORT
DOCUMENT F OR CPP F INAL RULE 3 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-11/documents/tsd-cpp-emission-performance-rate-goal-computation.pdf.
57. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 55, at
2–63.
FOR
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traditional rising marginal cost of emissions abatement curve. EPA expressly
noted that: “It is generally assumed in most energy efficiency projections
that the cost of installing energy efficiency measures will become more
expensive into the future as state programs move beyond ‘low-hanging
fruit’ and increasingly focus on achieving deeper and broader energy savings
through whole-building, multi-fuel programs addressing new buildings
and building retrofits.” 58
On the other hand, when applying the renewable energy building block,
EPA appears to have assumed a very different cost curve. In the proposed
rule, EPA looked at the “current goals of leading states in the same region,”
which reflected “renewable potential in particular regions of the country.” 59
EPA used “the state-level effective RE levels derived from RPS requirements
to quantify regional RE targets consistent with states’ reasonable level of
increased RE development.” 60 EPA derived regional RE generation targets
and growth rates and imposed “the same regional RE target in percentage
(share of total generation) terms to all states in a given region.” 61 The regional
targets would be set for the year 2029. “The EPA then determined the
constant rate at which each region would need to increase its generation
each year to reach the regional RPS target, if these rates are applied in the
period 2017-2029. The constant rate of annual RE generation increase
calculated from this approach is called the growth factor.” 62 Regional growth
factors varied from a low of 6% in the West region to a high of 17% in the
East Central region. 63
Implicit in the constant growth factor is that EPA either assumed a flat
marginal cost curve, or was simply indifferent to costs. What EPA did not
do was assume a rising marginal cost curve and assume that early growth
would be more rapid or that states that hadn’t done much already could
do more at lower cost. Indeed, EPA seemed to make the opposite assumption
in some cases, due to the design of the regional targets, as discussed infra.
Importantly, “the regional RE target is not applied directly as an
immediate requirement of each state, but is instead used to calculate a
regional growth factor that is then applied to each state’s pre-existing RE

58. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. O F AIR & RADIATION, PROJECTING EGU
CO2 EMISSION PERFORMANCE IN STATE PLANS 27 (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsd-projecting-egu-co2emission-performance.pdf.
59. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 51.
60. Id. at 4–12.
61. Id. at 4–19.
62. Id. at 4–19.
63. Id. at 4–18. The West region is comprised of Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming,
Montana, and all states to the west (except Alaska and Hawaii). The East Central region
is comprised of Ohio, West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New
Jersey. See id. at 4–14.
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generation, such that historic RE performance acts as a limiting factor on
the extent to which a state is assumed to reach the regional target.” 64 What
this meant was that “the absolute megawatt-hour target will be smaller for
states starting with a lower absolute amount of RE generation and larger
for a state starting with a higher absolute amount of RE generation.” 65
Moreover, “several states do not reach the RE percentage target in the proposed
approach, such as Kentucky in the Southeast and Nevada in the West.”66
Kentucky, which got 0% of its energy from renewables in 2012, would
only get to 1.9% by 2029, whereas Nevada, which was at 8% in 2012, would
get up to 19%. 67 By contrast, Ohio, which got only 1% of its energy from
renewables in 2012, would get to 10.6% by 2029, and Oregon, which got
12% of its energy from renewables in 2012, would get all the way up to
20.6% by 2029. 68
These vast discrepancies are due to several regional and state-specific
factors, but EPA was clear that its overall approach was “designed to
respect each state’s ability to improve toward the RE targets.” 69 Again,
EPA did not simply assume that all states faced a roughly similar (and rising)
marginal cost curve. Instead, EPA was sensitive to the various factors—such
as regional differences and natural endowments—that might limit states’
ability to “switch” power generation to renewables. While the CPP’s final
rule is still more complex—it both changes the final state targets and the
methods by which states can meet those targets 70—there is still no
assumption that states that have not deployed much RE can rely on “lowhanging fruit” to do more than states that have. 71
Indeed, the CPP has come under criticism from some states and
commentators for precisely this reason. States have complained that the
64. Id. at 4–19 (emphases added).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4–24.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 4–20 (emphasis added).
70. See Are you better off under the Clean Power Plan than you were 14 months
ago?, INT’L DIST. ENERGY ASS’N (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.districtenergy.org/blog/
2015/08/12/are-you-better-off-under-the-clean-power-plan-than-you-were-14-months-ago/.
71. On the other hand, some states with already robust RE are given relaxed targets
because each state is subject to the same RE growth assumption until it reaches the RE
generation target, whereupon it is kept at that target level for the remainder of the relevant
time period. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, GHG ABATEMENT
M EASURES 4–19 (2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/
20140602tsd-ghg-abatement-measures.pdf.
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CPP demands something of all states, and does not systematically “reward”
states that have already done more to switch to renewables, nor “punish”
states that have not. 72 Rather than being a flaw, this appears to be part of
the overall design.
C. A “Switching Costs” Approach
The above analysis of the Clean Power Plan and the CSAPR is
consistent with the notion that where a regulatory regime is focused not
simply on increasing efficiency, but on “switching” generation from one
form to another, we should assume a very different marginal cost of
abatement function and not simply demand more from states that have not
yet done much “switching.” In other words, the goal of the Clean Power
Plan was not simply to make current coal plants more efficient (i.e., building
block #1), but rather to replace some of those plants with low or no-GHGemitting renewables. In setting the regional targets to support its RE
building block, EPA was sensitive to natural endowments, such as sunshine
or wind, in order to set the assumed renewables growth rates for states within
that region. These natural endowments certainly affect the switching costs
for Building Block 3 faced by the states. There are also, of course, significant
capital costs involved in building out renewable capacity, whether it be
for wind or solar or other forms of renewable energy. Such capital costs
are particularly high for utility-scale thermal solar projects and offshore
wind projects. 73 Indeed, capital costs may be a reason to assume, in a
“switching” scenario, a marginal cost of abatement function that is not the
traditional steadily rising one, but rather one that has a significant “hump”

72. See Press Release, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Christie Admin. Seeks Admin. Stay
and Reconsideration of EPA’s Clean Power Plan (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.nj.gov/
dep/newsrel/2015/150073.htm (quoting DEP Commissioner Bob Martin, “One of the
greatest ironies of the so-called Clean Power Plan is that while New Jersey has made
great strides in reducing carbon emissions and other pollutants as well that cause smog
and other air quality problems, states that are upwind of New Jersey actually are assigned
emission reduction goals that fall far short of what New Jersey has already achieved.”);
see also WILLIAM W. BUZBEE ET AL., CTR . FOR P ROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN: ISSUES TO WATCH 62–63 (1506 ed. 2015), http://progressivereform.org/
articles/CPP_1506.pdf (“This ‘every state must do its part’ approach arguably results in failing
to reward states that made significant investments in de-carbonizing measures in the past
while rewarding those states that put off such investments,” while warning that generalizations
are “tricky” and that compliance cost estimates across states vary widely”).
73. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY
SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS 6 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/fore
casts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf.
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around the time when new facilities must be constructed. 74 This is especially
true when switching to renewables as opposed to natural gas. 75
IV. APPLYING A COST SENSITIVE MODEL TO THE
INTERNATI NAL CONTEXT
The state-specific targets in EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan received
much criticism from individual states on technical grounds, and the final
rule no doubt will be subject to technical criticisms. But for our purposes,
the key question is not whether EPA got its formula right or applied it
correctly in each instance. The question is whether the idea implicit in
EPA’s approach—that the different costs each state faces in terms of
switching to lower-carbon or no-carbon generation—should factor into an
allocation of emissions reductions. EPA’s plan raises the question of whether
compliance costs—as opposed to the more amorphous and difficult-to-assess
economic costs—should count in a substantial way when responsibilities
for a common pollution problem (here, climate change) are allocated among
states.
The first thing to note is that we assume the cost function for GHG
reductions in the international context will follow the more complex
“switching costs” function described supra instead of the traditional steadily
increasing function of the CSAPR. By “costs” we focus, as EPA does under
the Clean Power Plan, largely on switching costs—i.e., the costs of
switching from coal to gas, and gas to solar and/or wind. No doubt there
will be some high-emitting nations for which relatively low-cost efficiency
measures can do a great deal to reduce GHG emissions. But ultimately
we assume that such measures will be of limited value and that, ultimately,

74. There is also some reason to believe that the marginal cost of emissions abatement
would decrease after the capital expenditure “hump” as states (and nations) gain experience in
the new technologies. For example, Germany has lower installed costs of solar than the
United States, in part because its solar sector is more robust. See FRED HEUTTE, NW. ENERGY
COAL., EXPERIENCE CURVES AND SOLAR PV (2015), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/
media/6867808/2012-09-03-nwec-experience-curves-and-solar-pv.pdf.
75. EPA separately analyzed the costs of switching from coal to natural gas
(Building Block 2). There it found that the cost of fuel, and not capital costs, were the
major cost drivers. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note
71, at 6–5.
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those nations will face a “hump” in their cost curves as they are forced to
switch their forms of power generation. 76
Therefore, using the Clean Power Plan’s cost assumptions as a starting
point, we ask the question: could a “switching costs” approach form a plausible
basis for an international agreement? In other words, could an approach
that is sensitive to different nations’ costs (whether capital costs or natural
endowments) and different regional factors, resulting in potentially quite
varied emissions reduction goals, succeed where other approaches have
failed?
A. The Advantages of a Cost-Sensitive Approach
1. Facilitating Agreement
An approach of imposing relatively lower percentage reductions on states
or nations with relatively high switching costs could be helpful in obtaining
agreement among states or nations even if some sort of trading regime is
also part of the proposed regime. For a nation or state facing high switching
costs, the availability and costs of any emissions credits that could be bought
under a trading regime will, ex ante, be quite unpredictable. Thus, in deciding
whether to agree or how strongly to oppose a proposed emission reductions
target, the powers-that-be in the nation or state with high switching costs
will have to assume that they may be called upon to make all the emissions
reductions through actual reduction within their own borders as opposed
to relying on the possibility that lower cost emissions credits will be
available to be purchased from states or nations that face relatively lower
switching costs.
To make this point more concrete, imagine a regime with just two states
or nations—A and B. A has relatively high switching costs, because it
has four large coal-powered plants, no natural gas infrastructure yet, and
only modest but expandable wind power infrastructure that provides a
small fraction of its power. B has one old coal-powered plant, two natural
gas plants with expansion capacity and substantial wind, solar and hydropower
76. For simplicity’s sake, we focus here on power generation, because it is the single
largest sector responsible for GHG emissions globally. See THOMAS BRUCKNER ET AL.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP III FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REP. 516 (2014), available at file:///Users/erinmuniga/Downloads/ipcc_wg3_ar5_
chapter7%20(1).pdf. (noting that “[t]he energy supply sector is the largest contributor to global
greenhouse gas emissions” and that “[i]n 2010, the energy supply sector was responsible for
approximately 35% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions”). Nonetheless, we recognize that
GHG emission sources come from many different sectors, and power generation is only
one piece of the puzzle. We also recognize that a “switching costs” approach may be of limited
value for countries that currently have very little in the way of GHG emissions, but might
have such emissions in the future.
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infrastructure, with possibilities for expanded use. In a Kyoto-like regime,
both A and B might be told that they must reduce emissions by 50%. To
do so, A could close two of its four coal-powered plants, while developing
natural gas generation capacity and ramping up renewable capacity. The
costs of doing so would be high. State B would have to do quite a bit less
to meet its target, as it already has natural gas power generation and
renewable generation that could be ramped up to substitute for the power
currently generated by its single coal power plant (which, let us assume,
now accounts for a large share of its emissions). State B could exceed its
50% target by relying more on renewable expansion than natural gas
expansion, and it could then sell excess emissions credits to State A. But
State B might decide not to over-comply, that is, exceed the 50% target,
because of questions about the reliability of renewables. Moreover, if
State B did over-comply and exceed the 50% target, it might not want to
sell credits corresponding to any extra emissions reductions to State A at
all. Rather, State A might prefer to bank those credits as protection in case it
needs to emit more from its natural gas plants because of unanticipated
surges in power demands or because of problems of reliability in the power
produced by its renewables infrastructure. Indeed, under the S02 trading
regime established by the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, utilities engaged
in such banking, with the result that there was less selling by “overcomplying” utilities than might have otherwise been the case. Finally, ex
ante, State A would have no way of knowing the price of any credits that
would be sold by State B. The overall point is simply this: even where a
trading regime might help defray cost faced by states or nations that must
transition to cleaner energy ex post (after the targets are accepted by the
states or nations), ex ante, making targets sensitive to switching costs might
facilitate the agreement to targets by states or nations that face relatively
high switching costs.
2. Resonating with a Message of Unity
Second, being sensitive to switching costs treats climate change as a
wholly collective problem created by all, and for which all must make roughly
“equal” contributions in terms of increased electricity rates, at least. By
contrast, in approaches where allocation are based on percentage reductions
in a state’s emissions or emissions per capita, the costs any person incurs
may depend largely on his or her State of current residence. To make current
residency a key factor in the burdens individuals bear might be tenable if
we assume that the current residents of a state or nation are responsible in
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some meaningful sense for the aggregate or per capita emissions levels in
that state or nation. But where there is substantial mobility across state or
national lines, and/or where emissions levels in each state or nation are in
any case a result of historical choices made over several generations,
this assumption seems untenable. Thus, the switching cost approach has
a cosmopolitan, beyond-boundaries, all-in-it-together appeal that regimes
based on equal emissions reduction percentages do not.
The switching costs approach also avoids imposing different burdens
on relatively wealthier states as compared to less wealthy ones—at least
state GDP or per capita GDP is not an explicit criterion. By avoiding State
GDP as a factor, the switching costs approach avoids the normatively
intractable debates about whether there should be distributive justicebased redistribution from wealthy states to poor ones and how much richer
countries owe poorer ones and what counts as a rich or poor state. 77 In the
U.S. context, where there is a governance structure that allows for redistribution
from wealthy to poor regardless of State residence, as for example, in the
form of all subsidies for low-income households, EPA can avoid distributive
justice-based calls for greater costs to be borne by wealthy states without
simply ignoring distributive justice altogether.
B. Do the Advantages Apply Outside the U.S.?
These advantages of the switching costs approach may or may not
translate onto the international scale, where we are speaking of a group of
nations rather than a group of states that are part of a federal regime with
federal constitutional supremacy. The we-are-all-in-it-together appeal of
the EPA approach, as well as its implicit reliance on direct aid to individuals
as a means of addressing distributive justice, might work less well in the
EU context than in the U.S. context because of the greater sense of distinct
national identity and legal sovereignty EU member states have vis-à-vis
the EU, as compared to U.S. states vis-à-vis the U.S. government. The
normative appeal of the EPA approach might be even less robust in the
context of a multilateral agreement involving countries throughout the
planet.
However, the switching costs approach may help facilitate agreement
on the international level, just as it is intended to foster political consensus
domestically within the United States. The “break” given nations that face
large switching costs may make them less hesitant to enter into an

77. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman & Gayathri Vaidyanathan, All eyes on India in the wake
of U.S.-China agreement, E&E REP. (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/
2015/09/25/stories/1060025351 (noting that India’s Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the United
Nations focused on what he termed “climate justice”).
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agreement. Moreover, under this approach, more is asked of nations that
tend to have local or domestic politics that make them willing to do more.
Such nations have already acted in such a way as to create renewable
infrastructure, and a speedy ramp up in reliance on renewables, this is
often because these are nations where concern about climate change is the
greatest, and there is substantial domestic support for concerted action to
mitigate climate change.
Another advantage of the EPA approach, and perhaps its greatest, is that
it encourages the largest emissions reductions where they are cheapest to
achieve, and in that sense promotes cost-effectiveness and helps contain
the overall costs of climate change mitigation. To some extent a cap and
trade regime, and even more so, a carbon tax regime, would achieve the
same end of encouraging the biggest bang for the buck (or euro or . . . ) in
terms of emissions reduction. The EPA plan envisions some emissions
trading, which is legally controversial. To the extent, in the international
context, neither cap and trade nor a carbon tax are politically feasible, or
can only be implemented in part, EPA’s equal cost approach could be the
best available alternative to encourage the most cost-effective climate
change mitigation.
C. Disadvantages of a Switching Costs Approach
One disadvantage of a switching costs approach is that it is based on
predicted costs of emissions reductions, and such predictions require a large
amount of data that might not be accurate. Indeed, a number of states—
like New Jersey—and industry groups have argued that EPA’s cost
projections are faulty. On the other hand, emissions reduction percentage
regimes of all sorts require an understanding of emissions baselines, and
as the EU learned, estimates of such baselines require a great deal of
information and can be inaccurate. In any regime, collecting and analyzing
the needed data will not be straightforward and will require refinements.
The more persuasive criticism of the EPA approach is the one leveled
by New Jersey, as discussed supra: that it creates perverse incentives by
potentially assigning states that create clean power infrastructure higher
emissions reduction targets than states that declined to make such
investments. Under the EPA approach, a State might choose not to make
“voluntary” clean power investments because it would not want EPA to
respond by imposing upon the State additional emissions reduction obligations
that may be more than or on a faster and less flexible timetable than the
State otherwise would adopt on its own. Of course, as stated, states that
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are leaders in clean power investments might be exactly those states that,
as a political matter, are open to strong EPA climate policies and that will
continue to invest in cleaner power even if it is understood that stricter
EPA emissions reduction targets will result. California might be one such
state. Political economy and politics in each State vary, thus it is difficult
to judge the robustness of the perverse incentives argument. On the
international front, it may be even more difficult to say whether a switching
costs approach will lead nations to adopt a strategy of not undertaking
clean power investments they otherwise would have undertaken.
However, even if the perverse incentives argument is unpersuasive in
terms of predicting strategic behavior by states or nations, it has rhetorical
force, and the rhetorical force can translate into less support for a switching
costs approach than is needed, politically, for adoption and effective
implementation. For that reason alone, it is worth asking how a switching
costs approach could be configured to mitigate the perverse incentives
objection to it. Indeed, we see the shift between the proposed EPA rule and
the final one as, in part, an effort to do just that.
D. Mitigating Perverse Incentives
One way that any perverse incentives created by the EPA approach can
be mitigated is by structuring targets so that they reward a state or nation
by achieving an extent of switching ahead of time of what is required by
the first round targets. So, for example, assume that in a first round the
target a nation that has heavily invested in developing solar capacity is
given a relatively high target because its further ramp up costs for solar
are relatively low. The nation then ramps up solar even more than required
to meet its target and creates low-cost opportunities for further reliance on
renewables. In setting the round two target, the nation should not be
penalized for in effect over-enthusiasm, so its round two target should not
be ramped up to reflect that it now has even lower relative switching costs.
The nation might nonetheless continue to ramp up renewable production,
but the fact that it was not required to do so as part of the round two targets
could be key to avoiding political charges that the regime punished the
best actors. By the same token, switching costs may be reduced as a factor
in second and beyond targets so as to help ensure that the states with
relatively high switching costs do not intentionally continue to occupy that
position as a long-term matter.
Another way to mitigate the perverse incentives implicit in EPA’s
approach is to use it as only part of what goes into the setting of targets.
If targets are set so that switching costs is only say a forty or fifty percent
factor, the extent of any perverse incentives is proportionally reduced.
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It would seem that EPA, in its final rule, took both these tacks in
mitigating possible perverse incentives, although EPA did not explicitly
cite perverse incentives as its motivation. In the final rule, states that develop
“early” renewable capacity ahead of what their target would require receive
a credit they can use against future emission reductions requirements.
And in the final rule, the imposition of nationwide performance standards
for coal and natural gas plants in effect reduces the economic advantages
to states of not seriously considering building up renewable capacity. At
the international level, it is hard to imagine the imposition of a standard
floor for performance at coal and gas plants, but there might be shared
commitments to certain efficiency/performance targets along with aid
commitments from wealthier countries to poorer ones to help to them
achieve those kinds of targets. In fact, that structure—standard or uniform
commitments to performance coupled with a commitment to aid from
more technologically-advanced countries to less advanced ones—is found
in a number of international environmental agreements.
E. The Broad View—Many Ways Differentiate
In any workable international agreement regarding climate change, the
commitments, obligations and entitlements of nations may need to be
differentiated in order to achieve agreement and make the agreement
workable in practice. The circumstances of all the nations of the world,
after all, are extremely varied—far more varied than the circumstances of
the states in the United States. As one academic commentator recently
concluded:
The point is that there will not be one type of differentiation that ‘fits all’ and
covers all the very different circumstances and situations of parties. It will be the
right combination or ‘mix’ of substantive commitments, incentive structures,
entitlements, procedural requirements, etc., which will be crucial for the success
of a new agreement. A well designed and fine-tuned ‘catalogue’ of options (with
differing commitments or entitlements) which parties can choose from upon
signature or ratification might be a feasible way forward, reflecting the diversities
of a globalized and interconnected world in the sophisticated design of a
comprehensive agreement. 78

78.
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What the EPA approach to switching costs highlights is one useful way
to differentiate among participants to a climate change agreement, namely,
differentiation based on the relative magnitude of switching costs each nation
faces. In that way, the EPA approach offers guidance for the construction
of an international accord that was not previously a focus of either
commentary or an actual international accord.
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